李达.高校垃圾分类回收监管机制演化博弈分析[J].中国环境管理,2017,9(5):90-94.
LI Da.Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision Mechanism of Waste Sorted Collection in Colleges and Universities[J].Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2017,9(5):90-94. |
| 高校垃圾分类回收监管机制演化博弈分析 |
| Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision Mechanism of Waste Sorted Collection in Colleges and Universities |
| DOI：10.16868/j.cnki.1674-6252.2017.05.090 |
| 中文关键词: 垃圾分类回收 监管机制 演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词:waste sorted collection regulation mechanism evolutionary game |
| 基金项目:国家自然基金项目“大都市生活垃圾减量化的差别责任分析与路径研究”（71373030）；促进高校内涵发展——研究生科技创新项目“基于循环经济视角下的生活垃圾减量化研究”（5111623512）。 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 本文以高校和大学生为研究对象，运用博弈论方法，通过建立双方的演化博弈模型，分析了影响主体进行垃圾分类策略选择的不同因素。将对垃圾分类行为具有较强约束的“声誉资本”引入模型中，研究不同情况下的演化均衡策略。结果显示：①大学生是否采取垃圾分类行为主要与学生进行垃圾分类支付的成本C1、大学生因不参与垃圾分类造成的声誉损失h、学校的惩罚P以及参与垃圾分类得到的奖励R等因素有关。②大学生因不参与垃圾分类造成的声誉损失h对学生分类行为的影响显著。③学校是否采取监管策略主要与监管成本C有关。研究结果对于高校和政府制定环境监管政策具有重要的现实意义。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The impact factors of college student's waste sorted behaviors choice were analyzed in this paper, by establishing evolutionary game model based on the game theory. The reputation capital with stronger constraints in students' waste sorting behaviors was introduced into the model to find the evolutionary balance policies in different circumstances. The results showed the following aspects: ① Students' waste sorting behaviors are associated with such factors as the capital (C1) paid by students for waste sorting, reputation loss (h) caused students who do not participate in waste sorting, punishment (P) taken in universities, and reward (R) gained by waste sorting. These factors are correlated and dispensable each other; ② The reputation loss (h) exerts a great influence on students' sorting behaviors; ③ The regulatory measures taken in universities are related to the supervision capital (C). In this paper, the supervision mechanism establishment of waste sorting in colleges and universities was proposed on basis of the game analysis. |
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