杜建国,张靖泉.企业环境信息公开与政府监管策略的演化博弈分析[J].中国环境管理,2016,8(6):75-80.
DU Jianguo,ZHANG Jingquan.The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure and Government Supervision Strategies[J].Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2016,8(6):75-80. |
| 企业环境信息公开与政府监管策略的演化博弈分析 |
| The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure and Government Supervision Strategies |
| DOI：10.16868/j.cnki.1674-6252.2016.06.075 |
| 中文关键词: 企业环境信息 真实性 政府监管 演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词:corporate environmental information facticity government supervision evolutionary game |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“名牌产品供应链不良环境行为：形成、演化及治理策略研究”（71471076）。 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 由于企业与消费者、投资者、政府等利益相关者之间存在着信息不对称，而真实的企业环境信息是利益相关者做出决策的必要前提，所以具有良好环境行为的企业愿意公开真实的环境信息，但同时也会使不具有良好环境行为的企业有动机公开虚假的环境信息以谋取额外收益，进而导致企业环境信息的信号传递失效。针对此问题，本文考虑了相关主体的有限理性特征，构建了企业是否真实公开环境信息与政府监管行为交互的演化模型，分析了不同参数的变化对系统演化结果的影响，并通过数值实验模拟了不同初始状态和参数设置下的系统演化过程，得出了一定的结论。研究表明：初始状态时的政府监管概率、政府的监管成本、对企业公开虚假环境信息的惩罚、政府选择监管策略的收益、企业真实公开环境信息的收益和企业的伪装效果系数对系统的演化结果具有重要影响，通过政策手段对这些参数进行调控可以引导系统向良好模式演化，使企业公开真实的环境信息，达到环境信息的信号传递作用。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Information asymmetry exists between corporation and stakeholder such as consumer, investor, government and so on. The real corporate environmental information is a necessary precondition for stakeholder to make decision, so the corporation that has good environmental behavior is willing to disclose its real environmental information. But the corporation that has bad environmental behavior has motivation to disclose false environmental information for seeking extra benefit, which will lead to signaling failure of corporate environmental information. For this problem, considering the bounded rationality of related subjects, an evolutionary model of behavior interaction between corporation discloses environmental information factually or not and government supervision strategy was built in this paper, the influence of various parameters on evolution results was analyzed, and the evolutionary process was simulated under various initial state and parameters through numerical experiments. The research suggested that the initial supervision probability of government, the supervision cost, the penalty to corporation which discloses false environmental information, the benefit of selecting supervision for government, the benefit of disclosing real environmental information for corporation and the coefficient of corporate disguise effect all have important impact on the evolutionary result of system. Using policy to control related parameters, the system could be guided to a good evolution pattern in which corporation discloses real environmental information, and then the signaling effect of environmental information would be realized. |
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